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THREE PERSPECTIVES ON MEDICAL INJURY:
A COMMENTARY
Robert L. Rabin*

INTRODUCTION

One way of thinking about the role of tort law in our sociopolitical
system is to pose this question: To what extent does tort law make a
positive contribution to addressing the problem of accidental harm?
Unfortunately, engaging in this inquiry raises more questions than can
confidently be answered. In recent years, criticism of the tort system
has cast considerable doubt on each of its foundational precepts. The
optimal deterrence goal of the system is grounded in economic theory
that has never been demonstrated to have strong empirical support.1
The compensation goal of the system comes at a very high administrative cost, and by definition fails to satisfy a corollary principle of fundamental fairness in treating like injuries in like fashion. 2 And
agreement on the substantive content of a commitment to corrective
justice remains a bone of contention among philosophically minded
3
scholars.
If this state of affairs inspires a general sense of humility-let alone
unease-among torts enthusiasts, there has been little in the way of
respite by avoiding the broad terrain of tort and instead focusing on
particular sub-areas of accidental harm. As a consequence, one approaches a Symposium on medical malpractice, entitled Starting
Over?: Redesigning the Medical Malpractice System, 4 with some trepi* A. Calder Mackay Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. Thanks to Karen Rabin, M.D.,
for helpful comments on an earlier draft and to Suzanne Bratis for her research assistance.
1. See generally, e.g., Don Dewees & Michael Trebilcock, The Efficacy of the Tort System and
Its Alternatives: A Review of Empirical Evidence, 30 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 57 (1992); Gary T.
Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L.
REV. 377 (1994).

2. For an oft-cited study, finding that accident victims generally received somewhat less than
half of the dollars distributed in tort awards, see JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE,
COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION

(1986).

3. See generally, e.g., PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAw (David G. Owen ed., 1995)

(discussing a wide array of perspectives). For a critique of a slightly earlier generation of corrective justice scholars, see Gary T. Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and the Ethics of Strict
Liability, 15 GA. L. REV. 963 (1981).
4. Symposium, Starting Over?: Redesigning the Medical Malpractice System, 54 DEPAUL L.
REV. 203 (2005).
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dation, but also, more positively, with the conviction that multiple
pathways are open for exploring the contribution that tort law can
make to accident reduction, victim reparation, and an overall sense of
fair treatment.
On that score, the three articles that I have been asked to comment
on examine the medical malpractice system from decidedly different
vantage points. In Can You Trust a Doctor You Can't Sue?, Professor
Mark Hall adopts as his focal point the doctor-patient relationship,
and explores, as he puts it at the outset, "the consequences of medical
malpractice reform for patients' trust in their physicians and the
health care delivery system."5 By contrast, Professor Lori Andrews's
article, Studying Medical Error In Situ: Implications for Malpractice
Law and Policy, takes a systems analysis approach and reports on an
observational case study of the internal dynamics of medical error
identification in a large teaching hospital. 6 Finally, from still another
perspective, Professor Neil Vidmar and his co-authors' article, Uncovering the "Invisible" Profile of Medical MalpracticeLitigation: Insights
from Florida, sets its sights on an empirical examination of medical
malpractice litigation, offering recent data on claims and costs from a
7
study of the Florida tort system.
While each of these articles represents a distinct genre of scholarship, it is possible to view them as different aspects of the broader
inquiry I identified above-whether tort, in any given area, makes a
positive contribution to addressing the problem of accidental harm.
Beyond this loose connection, for purposes of organizing my comments, it is possible to view these three articles as dealing with the
following "flow" of physician-patient relations: from (1) initial contact
at the time of a presenting problem (Hall on the relationship of
"trust"); through (2) treatment procedures in a hospital setting (Andrews on medical error in the hospital context); and culminating at
times in (3) claims of adverse outcomes that trigger litigation (Vidmar
et al. on malpractice litigation claims and awards). I will discuss the
articles in that order.

5. Mark A. Hall, Can You Trust a Doctor You Can't Sue?, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 303 (2005).
6. Lori Andrews, Studying Medical Error In Situ: Implicationsfor Malpractice Law and Policy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 357 (2005).

7. Neil Vidmar et al., Uncovering the "Invisible" Profile of Medical Malpractice Litigation:
Insights from Florida, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 315 (2005).
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THE DYNAMICS OF MEDICAL INJURY

A.

Trust

Hall's article rests on the premise that the physician-patient relationship is distinct from tort law generally because most tort cases involve "strangers" or "thin contractual relationships."' 8 By contrast,
the physician-patient relationship is ongoing and characterized by
trust. 9 I could not agree more strongly with the importance of a sense
of trust to the ongoing relationship between patients and their physicians. But it is far from clear to me that the trust relationship can bear
the great weight that Hall would assign to it. In the myriad of "thin"
relationships that give rise to tort suits, something closely akin to
trust-if not quite so heavily freighted a concept-seems generally to
be in play. The product user victimized by a defective lawnmower or
vehicle braking system, the bus passenger injured by the carelessness
of her driver, or the retail shopper buried under a cascade of falling
boxes certainly has suffered a serious jolt to standing expectations
such that in the ordinary course of dealing with a service or product
supplier there will be, at a minimum, no deviation from customary
norms of safety. I am not sure one would call this "trust," but in
thinking about liability rules, I am equally unsure what turns on a distinction between trust and normal expectations of safety. 10
There is a more fundamental point here, it seems to me, that can be
characterized in ex ante and ex post terms. Hall tracks this characterization, in a sense, by distinguishing between trustworthiness and
trust." Trustworthiness, as he views it, is promoted by the received
doctrinal apparatus of medical malpractice, which is meant to promote adherence to customary standards of medical practice-hence,
encouraging physicians to exercise due care ex ante.12 Trust, by contrast, is an empirical, "psychological" phenomenon according to
Hall-a patient may have expectations about the physician's competence that in fact exceed the norms of customary expertise (or, I suppose, hypothetically at least, the patient might harbor sub-optimal
expectations).1 3 Again, while I would not quarrel with this point, I am
8. Hall, supra note 5, at 304.
9. Id.
10. In fact, Hall might have developed the relational theme more expansively through discussion of the physician's perspective on the breakdown of trust: in particular, the correlative concern about the costs of anticipatory defensive medicine. Hall's focus is primarily on the patient's
perspective in the relationship. Id. at 303.
11. Id. at 305.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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not certain what significance should be attached to it. I say this because trust, once Hall turns to the medical malpractice perspective, is
an ex post phenomenon; that is, he examines it in light of various medical malpractice reform proposals and links it to a discussion of restorative corrective justice principles.14
But the difficulty here is that ex post, trust seems no longer to have
any relevance to the physician-patient relationship. In the provision
of health care services, most malpractice occurs in the course of surgery, post-surgical care, or nonsurgical, in-patient procedures: consider, for example, the obstetrician who delivers a birth-damaged child
or botches an episiotomy, the nurse or resident who triggers a drugrelated mishap, or the anesthesiologist who is responsible for neurological damage. In virtually all of these instances, there is no continuing relationship; indeed, in the modern era of medical specialization,
"thin" relationships are the norm in circumstances where medical malpractice may occur. 15
More broadly, however, once a patient is sufficiently aggrieved by
perceived medical incompetence to pursue a tort claim, it seems
deeply counterintuitive to think that trust can be reestablished. Alternatively, it is plausible to think that a sense of fair treatment under the
circumstances can be created retroactively-what Hall seems to refer
to as fair process near the end of his article. 16 Any effort to design a
liability system that establishes a sense of fair treatment and just compensation-let alone a system that promotes optimal prevention by
efficiently identifying medical errors-seems an entirely different enterprise from striving to recreate trust in a broken relationship.
Hall is not indifferent to this point. Indeed, he observes that "malpractice law, like divorce law, assumes that when it is invoked, relationships are irreparably damaged.' 1 7 As a consequence, his central
theme addresses the question of how malpractice reform proposals
ought to take into account the special claims for redress arising from a
broken relationship of trust.1 8 From this vantage point, he offers brief
observations on an array of current tort reform proposals: neo-no
fault (encouraging early offers by health care providers limited to eco14. Hall, supra note 5, at 306-12.
15. See infra Part II.B (developing this point in greater detail and discussing preventable medical errors).
16. Hall, supra note 5, at 311-12.
17. Id. at 306.
18. Id. Note that this focal point is at odds with his opening intention of exploring "the consequences of medical malpractice reform for patients' trust in their physicians." See supra text
accompanying note 5. The causal arrow appears to point in the opposite direction. His perspective seems to focus on the consequences of patients' trust for medical malpractice reform.
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nomic loss), caps on non-economic loss, and administrative no-fault
compensation schemes. 19 Hall's discussion is, by his own account,
speculative-largely aimed at raising questions that deserve further
empirical exploration: the extent to which each of these strategies addresses vindication of a sense of betrayal experienced by a malpractice
20
victim as a consequence of breach of trust.
While I have no quarrel with empirical inquiry into the psychological aspects of breach of trust, I come full circle back to my earlier
observations about the universe of tort victims in thin relationships.
Surely, the claim of a rape victim against a landlord for providing inadequate security, the claim of a serious burn victim against a manufacturer for selling an excessively flammable product, or, for that
matter, the claim of a seriously injured transport victim against a perceived careless driver rests on a complex mix of desires. These desires
include economic redress as an end in itself and more subtle psychological motivations, such as seeking accountability, vindication, and/or
vengeance for a sense of betrayed expectations. Perhaps it indicates a
failure of imagination on my part, but I see no particular reason to
think that breach of patient-physician trust, despite its singular context, would play out differently from these other relationships in assessing current tort reform strategies.
B.

Preventable Medical Error

With all due respect, then, for the importance of trust in relationships between patients and physicians, it is difficult to see its bearing
on the potential goals of medical malpractice reform strategies. But
precisely what are those goals? In the political arena, the principal
goal appears to be easing the liability burden imposed on physicians
by reducing tort claims and damage awards. 21 Over the course of
three decades, there have been continuous waves of state legislative
tort reform, with the medical malpractice critics playing a prominent
role in the efforts to scale back costs imposed on physicians by tort
19. Hall, supra note 5, at 309-12.
20. Id. at 312.
21. These aims can be traced back to the enactment of the Medical Injury Compensation
Reform Act (MICRA) by California in 1975, which established a $250,000 cap on pain and
suffering recovery, maximum percentages on contingency fee awards, and a variety of other
limitations. See Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA) (codified at CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West 2003), CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333 (West 1997), CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §§ 340.5, 1295 (West 1982)). For a recent empirical study of the impact of MICRA's caps
on California jury trials, see NICHOLAS M. PACE ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CAPPING NON-ECONOMIC AWARDS IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TRIALS: CALIFORNIA JURY VERDICTS UNDER

MICRA (2004).
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litigation. 22 These reform efforts rest on related assumptions that
there is excessive malpractice litigation at too high a cost. As I will
discuss below, the Vidmar article contributes to an empirical literature
that calls these premises into question to some extent through exami23
nation of malpractice litigation trend data.
But a more fundamental issue is raised by the Andrews article:
Does the litigation-related data on claims in fact accurately reflect the
existing universe of preventable medical error? 24 If not, one can argue that the reform movement is in some measure misguided. It is
difficult to sustain the position that there is excessive litigation against
physicians if in fact tort suits constitute only the tip of an iceberg of
preventable medical errors that lies below the surface of identified
malpractice. Of course, it could still be the case that physicians in
certain areas of specialization are subjected either to an inordinate
volume of claims or intolerably high insurance premiums (or both);
obstetricians have been especially vociferous in this regard. 25 But
high-volume, undetected preventable medical error-largely off the
radar screen of present medical malpractice litigation-surely would
rank as a public health and liability law concern of the first order.
More recently, this phenomenon of medical injury has attracted attention of interdisciplinary research teams whose focus has been on
the identification and prevention of medical error from a systems
analysis perspective, focusing on the incidence of medical negligence
in the hospital setting. Two 'especially prominent efforts have been
the Harvard Medical Practice Study (Harvard Study) 26 and the Insti27
tute of Medicine Report (IOM Report).
The Harvard Study focused on determination of the incidence of
"adverse events" in the course of medical treatment by examining
hospital discharge records of patients based on neutral physician re22. The successive waves of tort reform litigation are described briefly, with cites to relevant
articles, in

MARC

A.

FRANKLIN &

ROBERT

L.

RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES

787-91 (7th ed. 2001).
23. In recent years, there have been empirical studies in this vein extending beyond the medi-

AND MATERIALS

cal malpractice area. See generally, e.g., Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093 (1996).

24. Andrews, supra note 6, at 357.
25. See Sarah Kershaw, In Insurance Cost, Woes for Doctors and Women, N.Y. TIMES, May 29,
2003, at A16; Maria Newman, In Mass Trenton Rally, Doctors Protest Malpractice Insurance

Costs, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2002, at B5.
26. HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY,

PATIENTS, DOCTORS AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL IN-

JURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK

and conclusions of this study are cogently discussed in

PAUL

C.

(1990). The data

WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRAC-

TICE ON TRIAL (1991).

27. IN sT. OF MED., To
et al. eds., 2000).

ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM

(Linda T. Kohn
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view. 28 The IOM Report reviews the Harvard findings and two follow-up studies in Colorado and Utah hospitals employing similar
methodology, in the course of a thorough analysis and set of2 9recommendations addressed to the reduction of preventable error.
Where does the Andrews study fit into this picture? In contrast to
the Harvard Study and IOM Report, which were based principally on
retrospective expert review of patient records, Andrews and her colleagues undertook an observational study of medical error. As she
reports it, they relied upon a group of "trained ethnographers" to attend work rounds and clinical meetings of medical teams at a large
(unidentified) teaching hospital over a nine-month period-1,047
team discussions in all. 30 These observers did not make independent
judgments about what constituted medical error generally, or preventable medical error with serious consequences-the latter defined as
errors resulting in "temporary physical disability, permanent disability, or death. '' 31 Rather, the observers relied on their coded notes
medifrom the sessions, recording preventable errors discussed by 3the
2
meetings.
and
rounds
work
their
of
course
the
in
cal teams
The conclusions offered in the Andrews study are distinctly
unsettling:
Nearly one in five patients had errors with a serious harm. Yet very
little was done to prevent further errors. The person who committed the error was rarely held accountable. And, when the error was
caused by an administrative problem (such as faulty equipment),
the administration was rarely informed, so it did not have the opportunity to correct the situation to prevent future errors. The findings of this study point to a crying need to find other means of
hospitals to identify, remedy, and prevent
pressuring or inducing
33
medical errors.
There are methodological issues that can be raised with the Andrews
study. To begin with the most obvious, the observers monitored only
a single hospital. As with all case studies, this raises a threshold issue
of generalizability. In this instance, that threshold concern is somewhat exacerbated by the fact that the study was conducted at a teaching hospital. There is no compelling reason to think that the findings
would carry over to the universe of non-teaching hospitals where the
28. See generally HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, supra note 26.

29. For a succinct analysis of these developments, see Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L.

REV.
30.
31.
32.
33.

1595, 1598-1603 (2002).
Andrews, supra note 6, at 359.
Id. at 361 n.9.
Id. at 359.
Id. at 358 (footnote omitted).
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reflective pedagogical structure of work rounds and clinical meetings
is not a core commitment of the institution. 34
Moreover, the study looks exclusively at surgicalservices. 35 By contrast, nonsurgical services-ranging from in-patient treatment of
pneumonia to cardiac patients-would not necessarily involve a like
set of procedures and potential errors. This is especially salient because the Andrews article indicates that a substantial percentage of
the identified errors occurred in post-operative routines, which by definition would not be precisely replicated in nonsurgical cases. 36
Apart from the intrinsic limitations of case study methodology,
there is a more subtle dimension to the emphasis on post-operative
conduct as well. Recall that the observers are privy only to the discussions of errors emerging in the course of work rounds and clinical
meetings-and by Andrews's own report, these discussions tended to
focus on blameworthiness in the conduct of lower status members of
the team, rather than in the conduct of attending physicians. 37 One
can question whether surgical errors reflecting poor techniques in the
operating room would even surface in these discussions.
Finally, to close the circle on threshold methodological issues, there
is a basic question about coding techniques employed by the observers. It appears that they were instructed not to make independent
assessments of error. 38 But of course any such instructions, however
appropriate they may be, are to some extent illusory. It seems highly
unlikely that any uniform set of linguistic signals characterized the discourse among the constantly shifting hospital personnel, engaging in
discussion under a variety of temporal and situational constraints.
Under such circumstances, it seems likely that ambiguity about what
constituted reference to "error" would arise with at least some degree
39
of frequency.
I want to be very clear that these methodological points are in no
way meant to undermine the significance of the conclusions reached
by Andrews and her colleagues. I raise them solely in the spirit of
34. It does not follow from the less structured patterns of self-criticism in nonteaching hospitals that there would be systematic differences in one direction or the other from teaching hospitals in the incidence of preventable error; other quality of care-related variables would also need
to be taken into account.
35. Andrews, supra note 6, at 358-359.
36. And, of course, the surgical errors would have no counterpart in nonsurgical procedures.
37. Andrews, supra note 6, at 367.
38. Id. at 359.
39. A variant on this concern is raised by the author when she cautions that serious injuries
may have been more frequent than the nearly one in five identified by the observers, because
"for many patients the level of harm was not discussed by the health care providers." Id. at 358
n.2.
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constructive criticism. Indeed, many of these methodological concerns, if they have validity, would suggest that in other hospital settings the incidence of preventable medical error identified by the
study-"[e]rrors seriously impacted 17.7% of the patients, ranging
from temporary disability to death" 4 0-may be even higher than this
case study suggests.
And what precisely is at the core of these failures of communication
and deficiencies in intra-system information flow regarding medical
error? In my view, the portrayal that emerges from this study is not
one of indifference to error; rather, the observational findings reveal a
professional enterprise characterized by a sharp disjuncture between
commitment to performance review and sensitivity to system-based
change. So long as the mission of critical assessment in work rounds
and clinical meetings is "getting it right the next time" as an end point,
without seriously evaluating larger organizational dysfunction, a significant portion of medical errors arguably will be endemic to the
system.
The Andrews article does not venture into particularized speculation on this point.4 1 But in the spirit of inquiry-and with a strong
disclaimer of expertise-I will pursue the point very briefly through
conjecture. Suppose that a statistically significant number of nursegenerated errors are committed by relatively inexperienced personnel
in the initial six months of service. Or perhaps, that a high proportion
of resident-attributable errors arise during the latter hours of roundthe-clock, on-call service when sleep deprivation is a serious concern.
Or, that medical technicians experience continuing logistical difficulties in dealing with administrators over equipment failures. If the focus of self-criticism is on the trees rather than the forest-that is,
criticism focusing on event-limited discussion of identified errors, as
contrasted to aggregate data assessment and analysis-it almost certainly assures that as personnel change, or indeed as they continue to
operate in the same work environment, errors will repetitively recur.
The Andrews article is certainly sensitive to these concerns. Indeed, the study was designed to track the relationship between identified errors, occurrence reports, and patient claims. And the article
targets the disjuncture to which I refer:
There were only a few instances in which the errors led the health
care workers to think systematically about a problem and to devise
a response that involved preventing future errors rather than cor40. Id. at 361.
41. The study identifies three categories of error: "individual, interactive, and administrative."
Id. at 363. But there is not much detail offered about the precise nature of these errors.
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recting them after the fact. In 68.7% of the errors (which had a
response) there was a response aimed at correcting the immediate
problem, compared to less than 1% with a response aimed at devising specific means for preventing future errors. In fact, more errors
(4%) had responses aimed at talking to patients to cool them out
than responses aimed at preventing future errors.4 2
In the final analysis, however, I remain somewhat skeptical about
the prospects for achieving significant gains in reduction of medical
error through the malpractice reforms discussed in the article. The
strategy for reform that the article initially discusses-creating a duty
to disclose errors on the part of the health care provider-requires no
expansion of existing case law doctrine, as Andrews herself indicates. 43 Just such a duty is a natural extension of the fiduciary obligations growing out of the physician-patient relationship. Yet, there is at
present almost invariably no disclosure of the low-visibility errors
identified in this study, as the study itself documents. 44
A cluster of strategies that Andrews appears to find most promising
would target the hospital for organizational responsibility resulting
from all incidents of preventable medical error, rather than maintaining the current system of assigning malpractice liability to blameworthy physicians. 45 This proposal first achieved wide currency in the
aftermath of publication of the Harvard Study, and has been forcefully promoted by members of that interdisciplinary team.46 While
the concept of organizational liability on its face seems nicely congruent with the systems-based empiricism of the Andrews study, I remain
skeptical about whether it would lead to meaningful change.
As a threshold matter, if one gives credence to Andrews's findings,
there is a serious question of the extent to which organizational liabil42. Id. at 365.
43. Andrews, supra note 6, at 373.
44. Id. at 369. Andrews makes passing mention of a second strategy, referred to as "other
health care providers' duty to disclose," which would, as she describes it, "require not only that
the erring physician disclose his or her errors, but also that other health care providers who
witness the error or its effects disclose as well." Id. at 378. In this situation, it seems far less
likely that the courts would recognize a duty to report on the part of the third-party provider.
See, e.g., Clarke v. Hoek, 219 Cal. Rptr. 845 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding no duty owed by defendant
doctor who was proctoring an operation performed by a surgical team). Even if such a duty
were recognized, the likelihood that third-party providers would report on their brethren in
these low-visibility situations seems slight.
45. Along with organizational liability, Andrews mentions, very briefly, liability under standard agency principles of respondeatsuperior and corporate liability. Andrews, supra note 6, at
378-82. Surprisingly, she makes no mention of no-fault liability, which has been frequently proposed in tandem with organizational liability. See WEILER, supra note 26, at 114-58; see also
Mello & Brennan, supra note 29, at 1626-28.
46. See, e.g., WEILER, supra note 26, at 122-32; see also Mello & Brennan, supra note 29, at
1624-28.
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ity would cast a substantially wider net than is presently the case. By
her estimation, ninety-two percent of preventable errors are attributable to medical team personnel whose negligence would currently impose liability on a hospital under conventional respondeat superior
doctrine. 47 Only the attending physicians are ordinarily characterized
as "independent contractors"-consequently shielding the hospital
from liability as4 8a principal-in the hospital setting that the Andrews
team observed.
Moreover, there is a residual category of malpractice liability that
49
occurs outside the context of in-patient hospitalization. Presumably,
this latter subset of negligent incidents-ranging from diagnostic errors in outpatient care in an office or clinic setting to care in an assisted living facility-are either independent of the reach of
organizational liability or raise systemic issues distinct from those discussed in this Commentary. At the outset, then, and even aside from
the tort immunities for charitable and municipal liability that Andrews
notes as obstacles, 50 a question warrants further exploration: How
much additional coverage would an effectively implemented system of
organizational liability provide?
This question, in turn, raises correlative issues about the likely penetration of a system of organizational liability-that is, the likelihood
that organizational liability would in fact unblock the systematic deficiencies in channels of communication that constitute the principal
findings in the Andrews study. The central question here is whether
there would be likely positive incentive effects from adopting organizational liability.
51
Two substantial obstacles occur to me. From a top-down vantage
point, one can ask why a hospital would have greater incentives than
is presently the case to ferret out preventable errors by insisting on
47. Andrews, supra note 6, at 386.
48. Another traditional category of independent contractors in the hospital milieu has been
emergency room doctors, but they are outside the scope of the Andrews study. It should be
noted, however, that in some instances, emergency room doctors-and less frequently, attending
physicians-might come under the cloak of respondeat superiorthrough resort to the doctrine of
apparent, or ostensible, authority. See, e.g., Baptist Mem'l Hosp. Sys. v. Sampson, 969 S.W.2d
945 (Tex. 1998) (holding that the hospital did not create ostensible authority when a variety of
warnings were issued to disclaim liability).
49. Andrews cites an estimate that eighty percent of malpractice claims arise in a hospital
setting. See Andrews, supra note 6, at 359 n.3. But the studies she cites are from the mid-1980s
or earlier. Id.
50. Id. at 384.
51. For a more detailed discussion of reservations about organizational liability, see David A.
Hyman, Medical Malpractice and the Tort System: What Do We Know and What (If Anything)
Should We Do About It?, 80 TEx. L. REV. 1639, 1647-54 (2002).
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more effective channels of communication. If identification and communication of low-visibility preventable errors were somehow likely
to be enhanced by moving to organizational liability, that would be a
promising development. But why would this occur? The mechanism
by which any such action-forcing would be attained is not self-evident.
The desired response seems to depend on the magnitude of the additional costs hospitals would incur by shouldering liability currently assignable to affiliated physicians. Those costs would have to signal the
likely imposition of liability that would, in turn, trigger systemic revamping of information and communication flows within the institution. This raises empirical cost-benefit questions, of course, and
Andrews's data do not provide a clear answer. Indeed, the prospect
of more substantial organizational liability might well cut in the opposite direction-towards dampening the organizational enthusiasm for
identifying low-visibility error. At best, there seems to be a missing
link in the argument here.
Similarly, the prospects for action-forcing on the part of attending
physicians and hospital personnel are elusive. One can phrase the
matter as the following: Is there reason to think that immunity of
medical personnel from personal liability would unblock the channels
of communication? As the Andrews study indicates, a considerable
proportion of medical error is assignable presently to hospital employees, who as a practical matter are shielded from liability.5 2 Yet, the
predicament remains.
Most critically, however, a tension exists in the claims being made
for organizational liability. Thus, Andrews asserts that "the cost of
litigation would be less and there would be less delay due to fingerpointing, because each of the health care providers involved in the
care of a particular patient would no longer have an incentive to
blame the error on someone else."'5 3 This statement follows close
upon the prediction that organizational liability "would create incentives for hospitals to better monitor and respond to problems in the
delivery of health care. '' 54 But if identification of errors by providers
does not lead to potential sanctions, either in the form of reassignment of responsibilities, revocation of privileges, or loss of employment, it seems a toothless affair. Cognizant of these possible
consequences of highlighting responsibility, why would the reticence

52. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
53. Andrews, supra note 6, at 384.
54. Id. at 383.
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of medical service providers to communicate error information 55be reduced, even if there was no prospect of personal tort liability?
I am not suggesting that preventable medical error is necessarily an
intractable problem. But it remains to be demonstrated that the tort
liability system can make a meaningful contribution to this effort.
Most critically, tort appears to be largely endogenous to the dynamics
that drive the system of organizational behavior in the hospital setting.
As I have suggested above, at least as portrayed in the Andrews study,
that system is largely task-oriented: the focal point is treatment and
of
assessment on a patient-by-patient basis, with the larger dimensions
56
screen.
radar
the
off
largely
standards
performance
institutional
Moreover, intrinsic features of the tort system itself reinforce the
disconnect in medical malpractice cases. Tort can only serve as a sensitive barometer of health and safety concerns if evidence of injury is
readily identifiable to the victim. But in singular fashion within the
universe of accidental harms, there is a failure of transparency in the
landscape of medical error due to the preexisting health problems that
trigger medical care in the first instance. Victims of a defective product or auto accident are clearly cognizant of the fact that they have
suffered a discrete injury; mishaps in the course of medical treatment
are frequently not self-evident.
Under these circumstances, the two reformist camps seem disconcertingly off-center in the menus of medical malpractice reforms that
they offer for public policy consumption. The MICRA-model tort reform enthusiasts may well succeed in reducing the costs of malpractice
57 But
liability for beleaguered medical specialists like obstetricians.
this strategy addresses a distinctly different set of issues from the public health concerns associated with preventable medical error. The organizational liability/no-fault proponents are closer to being on target.
Nonetheless, the thrust of their proposals, to the extent the focus is on
the tort forum, is significantly blunted by the informational prerequi55. Indeed, Andrews asserts that "[i]f physicians are no longer named in suits, there will need
to be an alternative mechanism for providing their names to [a national practitioner] Data
Bank." Id. at 384.
56. Nonetheless, I am mystified by Andrews's finding that it is relatively unusual for providers, in the course of detecting errors, to communicate information about equipment failures to
hospital administrators. Id. at 358. This inattentiveness seems to cross the border from lack of
commitment to institutional performance standards into indifference to prospective case-by-case
error avoidance in an especially compelling way.
57. For recent evidence of the substantial impact of MICRA-type caps, see Rhonda L. Rundie, Effect of Malpractice Caps Is Tallied, WALL ST. J., July 13, 2004, at D4. The article discusses
the RAND Institute for Civil Justice's recently published report on the impact of caps in California (see supra note 21). See also Rachel Zimmerman & Joseph T. Hallinan, As Malpractice Caps
Spread, Lawyers Turn Away Some Cases, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2004, at Al.
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sites of tort claiming-that is, the need to characterize oneself as an
injury victim-and the internal norms of medical team self-critiquing
in the work routines just discussed.
Delineating the pathway to effective reform is beyond the scope of
this brief Commentary, as well as beyond my limited expertise in the
highly complex world of provision of health care services. But the
road to efficacious reform seems to point in the direction of far
greater reliance on the medical profession than on the lawyers. 58 At a
macro-level, the economics of delivering health care services may
shape core characteristics of medical practice that enhance the risk of
what is viewed as preventable medical error-such as alertness-challenging, physician on-call schedules. If reform at this foundational
level is to be undertaken, surely the lead must come from the medical
profession rather than the judicial forum in the course of tort
litigation.
Moreover, a similar assessment seems just as applicable to microlevel patterns of preventable error-whether the focal point is systematically occurring errors in routine interventions by nursing personnel,
repetitive errors by especially risk-prone medical team members, or
sub-optimal protocols for administering drug orders. Unless a more
proactive role is assigned to hospital quality assurance committees,
and a concomitant commitment is made by hospital administrators to
greater transparency, it seems likely that a decade or so from now,
when another round of projects like the Andrews study or the IOM
Report is published, not much will have changed.
C.

Claims and Costs

Does the foregoing discussion cast the Vidmar article, reporting
trend data on claims and costs in Florida medical malpractice litigation, in an anticlimactic light? I would prefer to say that it puts the
findings in clearer perspective. By the authors' own admission, the
data have no bearing on how much medical error is in fact occurring. 59
Rather, Vidmar's principal data source is closed claim files of award
payments by Florida insurers. 60 Notably, this is a source based on pa58. See, e.g., Gina Kolata, Program Coaxes Hospitals to See Treatments Under Their Noses,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2004, at Al. The article discusses a rating system recently developed by
federal Medicare administrators that identifies lifesaving treatments for heart attacks, heart failure, and pneumonia. The system responds to the systematic underutilization of these treatments
with carrot and stick sanctions (targeting identified hospitals for bonus payments or public disclosure on the Internet, respectively).
59. See Vidmar et al., supra note 7, at 329.
60. The study covers a fourteen-year period from 1990 through 2003. Id. at 318. A secondary
data source is an archive of jury verdict reports compiled by Westlaw. Id.
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tient identification of medical error and consequent filing of a tort
claim. Moreover, there is no necessary correspondence between filing
of a tort claim and accurateperception of medical error; indeed, other
studies have suggested a substantial disparity between success in court
and negligence in fact on the part of the defendant physician. 61 What
follows from these intrinsic limitations of the Vidmar findings, in view
of my earlier discussion, can be visualized as concentric circles representing two universes that overlap only minimally-in one instance,
Andrews's observed system of preventable medical error in a hospital
setting, and in the other instance, Vidmar's claims-based system of
contested tort cases.
As a consequence, the main import of Vidmar's analysis is the light
it sheds on the continuing tort reform debate in the political forum.
On this score, it provides ammunition for contestants on both sides of
the battlefield. Tort reform enthusiasts can point to the steadily rising
median and mean award levels between 1990-2003, in support of their
argument that medical malpractice awards continue to generate pressures of higher insurance costs for physicians. 62 The plaintiffs' bar, in
turn, can take comfort in Vidmar's findings that aggregate trend data
on both claims and litigation costs have remained relatively level over
63
the same period.
Stepping aside from the heat of battle, it is hard to know what to
make of all this. On the one hand, should the observer be reassured
by a finding that the trend-line of malpractice claims is holding steady,
if-to return to the earlier discussion-formal legal claims represent
only the tip of the iceberg of public health concerns associated with
preventable medical error? On the other hand, should one be unsettled by the steadily rising-and not readily explained-trend-line in
mean and median size of awards for injury claims of varying degrees
of severity, without some baseline indication of what would be the
"correct" range of awards for the harms in question? It is hard to
61. See, e.g., Stephen D. Sugarman, Dr. No, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1499, 1501 (1991) (analyzing
the data from the Harvard Medical Practice Study and Paul Weiler's subsequent interpretive
account (see sources cited supra note 26), and concluding that "some thirty percent of the claims
where malpractice did not occur also result in some payment ... albeit a payment that is often
substantially discounted from the amount of the claimant's likely recovery had liability been
clear").
62. Vidmar et al., supra note 7, at 338. There are possible responses, of course, such as that
inflation in medical costs is itself a principal source of rising award levels. Vidmar surveys this
and other possible explanations, and concludes that there is no clear single factor explanation.
Id. at 338-39.
63. Id. at 334. Vidmar is careful to note that because of the time-lag between filing and closing claims, the data may not fully reflect increases in claims after 2000.
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resist the impulse to conclude that the adversaries are skirmishing inconclusively on the less consequential public health battleground.
III.

CONCLUSION

If there is a single point of convergence among these three studies,
and in my own thinking as well, it is on the importance of continuing
empirical investigation of the phenomena surrounding medical mishaps. In particular, both Andrews and Vidmar provide case studiesof a single hospital and a single state, respectively. Before we can
reach any definitive conclusions about what systematic changes in organizational behavior ought to be put in place, a good deal more information needs to be generated at the ground level, so to speak, on
typologies of preventable errors and particulars of provider settings in
which prevention measures would be-or currently are being-implemented. Similarly, before we can sensibly assess the sharply contrasting viewpoints on more conventional medical malpractice reform, we
need more precise aggregate data on claims and costs across a wider
array of states, as well as a focused inquiry on liability costs by area of
professional specialization and in organizational settings. In sum,
these articles point in the right direction, but are closer to an agenda
for further policy-oriented research than a roadmap for meaningful
reform.

